Bitter Harvest: Israel-Palestine’s Inevitable Outcome?

The decimation of Israel’s peace camp is often attributed to Palestinian violence during the 2nd Intifada and after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, but other factors also played a role. Demographic shifts and the rise of a nationalist-religious movement, led by influential figures like Naftali Bennett, significantly steered Israeli politics to the right, transforming the conflict into a divine mission for many.

The 7 October attacks by Hamas in Israel killed some 1200 people and 253 were taken hostage. The ensuing fighting has claimed the lives of 37,500 Palestinians, injured 79,000, and destroyed much of Gaza’s infrastructure. 2.3 million Palestinians have been repeatedly uprooted on a greater scale than the 1948 Nakba when 750,000 Palestinians were ethnically cleansed or fled their homes during Israel’s war of independence. In the West Bank, more than 553 Palestinians have been killed.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is hearing a charge of genocide against Israel. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is seeking arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel’s Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas leaders Yehya Sinwa, Mohammed Deif, and Ismael Haniyeh for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

All this, when only the week prior to 7 October, the US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan claimed that the Middle East was the quietest it had been in decades. Predicting the future is difficult. However, what is happening now is not surprising. It is a consequence of several trends: Israel’s political shift to the right; feckless US engagement, and a Palestinian nationalist movement bereft of leadership and options.

Israel’s turn

Popular wisdom has it that Israel’s peace camp was decimated because of Palestinian violence during the 2nd Intifada and after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza strip: “we withdrew from Gaza, and we got rockets and Hamastan.” While this argument is valid, there were two other changes occurring: one demographic, another political. Veteran Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea wrote in 2003 how the settler movement had already captured key positions in government, the security services and the media, and had an outsized influence in Israel.

Politically, the steer to the right, and the messianic, was turbo-charged in the 2010s by enterprising politicians like Naftali Bennet who reinvigorated a nationalist-religious movement and made it the rising force in Israeli politics today. This impulse accepts the belief that Israel is promised to them by God, “how can you occupy your own land?,” and has transformed a secular conflict into a divine mission. Israel’s Minister for National Security Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich cut their teeth in opposition to the 1993 Oslo Accords and the 2005 disengagement. They have been plotting their assault on the secular institutions of the state, like Israel’s Supreme Court, for years. On taking office in 2022 they successfully overturned the 2005 Disengagement law, shredded what was left of the Oslo Accords in the West Bank, piled pressure onto the Al Aqsa Mosque, and plan to resettle Gaza. In essence they are remaking Zionism.

Feckless US engagement

After the 1993 Oslo Accords, the US approach to the conflict was consistent. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, in their second terms, sponsored negotiations for a two-state solution: Camp David 2000, Annapolis 2008, and the 2013-2014 (John) Kerry talks. Much blame has been dispersed as to why these talks failed. Regardless, the fundamental challenge has been how to address the asymmetry between the protagonists when the US has championed an agreement between the parties, as opposed to a legal or rights-based approach, which would afford equal treatment between them. The 2013-2014 Kerry talks defaulted to a negotiation between Jewish American negotiators and Netanyahu’s government, the Palestinians playing a bit-part. Secretary of State John Kerry was called a terrorist by Naftali Bennet. Defence minister Moshe Ya’alon described the American security plan as worthless. It was a bruising encounter.

The deep antipathy between Obama and Netanyahu surfaced early when Obama pushed Israel to stop building settlements and, behind Netanyahu’s back, began a clandestine negotiation with Iran. Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress on 3 March 2015, and railed against the Iran nuclear deal. It was an unprecedented insult to a sitting president. In response the Obama administration in December 2016 abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 2334 stating that Israeli settlements had no legal validity, including in East Jerusalem. The Trump campaign smelled blood, and went all in on Israel to win votes at home.

After assuming office, Trump moved the US embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The PLO office in Washington D.C. was closed. US funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) ceased. Donald Trump recognised Israel’s sovereignty of the Golan Heights and Netanyahu turned earth on a new settlement there called “Trump Heights.” Israeli settlements were deemed legal and settlement products could be sold in the US labelled as “made in Israel.” The US withdrew from the Iran Nuclear deal. A peace plan, spearheaded by Jared Kushner, annexed a third of the West Bank to Israel. It gained no traction with the Palestinians. Some Israelis condemned it for offering too much.

The Trump administration oversaw the 2020 normalisation of relations between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Netanyahu described it as “shrinking the conflict.” It showed that Arab countries were prepared to move on. The Palestinians saw it as a betrayal.

Palestinian Options

Palestinian politics has been at an impasse since Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections (PLC), and the June 2007 Hamas Fatah civil war when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. The US, EU, Israel, and Egypt conditioned direct engagement with Hamas, and between Fatah and Hamas, on the basis that it foreswears violence, and recognises Israel and past agreements; conditions which Hamas has rejected. Consequently, for 17 years, Gaza has been under blockade. All movement of goods and people and even calories are closely regimented; it is an open-air prison. Each subsequent war has been an attempt to overturn the blockade, which has incentivised violence.

Separately, there have been a dozen failed attempts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah and to re-legitimise Palestinian institutions as no elections have been held since 2006. Palestinian leaders have been bitterly criticised by their own people and regional supporters. In response, Hamas produced a major reform initiative through its 2017 General Principles and Policies document in which it indicated that it would accept the national consensus around the two-state solution. However, it would not compromise on the right of return nor the right to resist the occupation. Hamas was ignored.

The Palestinians hoped the Biden administration would be different. Hamas and Fatah agreed again to hold elections for the PLC and the presidency in May and July 2021. More than 80 percent of eligible Palestinians registered for the elections, which were cancelled at the last minute. Abu Mazen claimed that he did this because Israel would not allow elections to proceed in East Jerusalem. Privately, Mazen feared a Hamas victory similar to the 2006 elections. Another attempt at political renewal was lost. Hamas were furious with what they called an Abu Mazen coup. It is in this context that Hamas’ military wing began afresh to plan a big attack against Israel.

After elections in Israel in 2022 the extremist government openly espoused annexing the West Bank, dismantling the Palestinian Authority, and expelling Palestinians. Close observers warned of a 3rd intifada. The outlook was grim.

Conclusion

The 7 October attack and the second Nakba might not have happened in different circumstances: a coherent Palestinian nationalist movement, a Zionist consensus, a bipartisan US approach that treats the stakeholders on equal terms, and policies that don’t incentivise violence.

How these issues should be addressed is the obvious challenge. But if they are not, then expect similar outcomes.

Dr Peter Bartu is a Lecturer in Global Studies at UC Berkeley and was in Benghazi and Tripoli throughout the 2011 revolution as part of the UN’s standby mediation team.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.