Europe finally appears serious about rearming. German legislators have agreed to exempt defense from constitutional limits on debt spending. The European Commission is urging members to raise military budgets to 3 percent of GDP and issue joint debt to fund weapons purchases — moves that could unlock more than 800 billion euros (US$866.16 billion) in additional spending over four years.
If European leaders are to build truly capable militaries that no longer depend on the US, they would need to change how they spend on defense, not just how much.
To be effective, any new funds must be deployed strategically, efficiently and cooperatively — something Europe has historically struggled to manage. Billions in joint EU funding for COVID-19 relief, for instance, were allegedly lost to fraud and waste; accountability has been a problem.
Past defense build-ups have fueled fragmentation rather than cooperation. European militaries field 29 different types of major warships, 27 howitzers, 20 fighter jets and 17 main battle tanks. By comparison, the US operates four, two, six and one respectively. That overlap inflates costs and dilutes effectiveness. Consolidation alone could free up 30 percent more resources, the European Defense Agency estimated.
Despite its plethora of platforms, Europe continues to rely on the US for capabilities that are core to its security, including airlift, missile defense, precision-guided munitions, and intelligence and surveillance systems. Over the past decade, European nations spent US$100 billion on US-made arms. Almost two-thirds of imports by European NATO states from 2020 to last year came from the US.
The immediate task must be to shore up Ukraine’s defenses. Allowing the country to falter would create instability on Europe’s doorstep, weaken deterrence, embolden Russia and ultimately require even greater defense expenditure. Realistically, that means some of the new funds would also have to be spent on US-made artillery, missile-defense systems and other capabilities, while European factories gear up.
Achieving genuine defense autonomy would demand deeper reforms, many outlined in a white paper issued by the commission last week. The top priority is to rationalize procurement. European countries too often invest in platforms unsuited for modern combat or which are not the best use of available resources (the UK’s aircraft carrier fleet is a case in point). Notably, only 18 percent of European procurement was collaborative in 2021, well below even the modest target of 35 percent.
Nations with often very different ideas of what constitutes security would quickly have to agree on a defense concept. Leaders must confront national protectionism head-on, promoting policies that favor integration and interoperability over continued duplication. (The Eurofighter aircraft and MBDA Missile Systems Services SAS, the pan-European joint venture in missile manufacturing, show cooperation at scale is possible.)
Next, European manufacturers would require stable, long-term defense contracts. Companies would only invest in building sustainable industrial capacity and developing a skilled workforce if they can count on a predictable pipeline of orders.
Finally, Europe’s defense sector must attract more private-sector investment. Venture capital flows lag considerably behind those in the US. Clear regulatory frameworks and targeted tax breaks can help spur innovations in emerging technologies such as drone, cyber and electronic warfare.
While the commission can encourage such changes, only national capitals combining forces can see them through. Existing NATO infrastructure offers one ready means of coordination. Having long called on its allies to do more, while paradoxically discouraging a European defense identity that would pull orders from US firms, Washington should welcome and support the process. It, too, would be stronger if Europe spends more on its defense — and spends better.
The Editorial Board publishes the views of the editors across a range of national and global affairs.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
I have heard people equate the government’s stance on resisting forced unification with China or the conditional reinstatement of the military court system with the rise of the Nazis before World War II. The comparison is absurd. There is no meaningful parallel between the government and Nazi Germany, nor does such a mindset exist within the general public in Taiwan. It is important to remember that the German public bore some responsibility for the horrors of the Holocaust. Post-World War II Germany’s transitional justice efforts were rooted in a national reckoning and introspection. Many Jews were sent to concentration camps not
RSS