Militant attacks have become routine in Pakistan in recent years. Relentless campaigns by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in particular, have left the country’s security forces in a state of paralysis, unable to effectively respond to the deteriorating security situation. Tight censorship over the media has further obscured the full extent of these attacks from the public. Against this backdrop, Islamabad has attempted desperately to keep an increasingly impatient Beijing on side, while also hoping to thaw relations with Washington and the new Trump administration. Still, without taking back control of the country from militants, Pakistan risks seeing its relationships with its two most vital benefactors wither away.
On March 11, the BLA claimed responsibility for one of its most sophisticated operations so far, a train hijacking in the heart of Balochistan province. The attack on the Jaffar Express happened at the mountainous Bolan Pass between Quetta to Peshawar. It was carrying around 450 passengers, including at least 100 military and intelligence personnel — although some accounts place the latter figure closer to 200. An abridged video the group subsequently published documented the attack, in which explosives erupted on the tracks, bringing the train to an abrupt halt. Then, militants disembarked its passengers and executed nearly 30 members of the Pakistani security forces in an ordeal lasting more than a day and a half.
The attack was part of the group’s long-standing secessionist campaign for the Balochistan province, with the hostages serving as bargaining chips in exchange for the release of Baloch political prisoners. The BLA has long attacked Pakistani security forces and state infrastructure, but the audacity of the hijacking makes it one of the most sophisticated operations to date.
For over 30 hours, the Pakistani military attempted to free the hostages trapped in the remote, mountainous terrain where they were held captive. By the evening of March 12, the BLA announced it had killed 50 hostages, citing the government’s “failure to engage in a serious prisoner exchange.” The military eventually wrestled back control, declaring its operation a success and claiming to have killed all 33 militants and rescued 300 passengers.
Accounting for the scale of the rescue attempt, which involved hundreds of troops, special forces, and the Pakistani air force, Junior Interior Minister Talal Chaudhry revealed that militants wearing suicide vests embedded themselves with the hostages, hence the delay in an already challenging mission. But with the military’s iron grip on information and its refusal to let independent media cover the incident, the official account is unverifiable. The BLA has openly disputed the government’s narrative, challenging authorities to allow “independent journalists and impartial sources” access to the battleground to report on the real losses suffered by the Pakistani army.
It isn’t just the BLA that disputes the military’s narrative, spun by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). A police official who witnessed events claimed around 70 to 80 militants escaped during the first night and before security forces engaged with those who remained.
If true, this raises serious questions about the military’s recollection of events and implies that the majority of armed assailants involved in the hijacking may have fled and remain underground plotting further attacks. This, coupled with conflicting reports that dozens of passengers are still unaccounted for, suggests that the purported “rescue” was nothing short of a fiasco.
This debacle adds to a growing list of failures by Pakistan’s military and security forces in their thus far ineffectual efforts to achieve a comprehensive victory against the many militant groups operating inside the country. In fact, the heavy handed so-called “counter-terrorism” operations employed by the Pakistani state often result in the deaths of more civilians than militants, both inside and outside of the country.
The audacity of the hijacking and its excessive death toll will meet consternation in Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party has been growing ever more exasperated by the unfolding events in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, where locals have expressed discontent over the exploitation of the region’s resources and the lack of any promised benefits.
Meanwhile, abductions, torture, and extrajudicial killings of alleged dissidents by the security services have only further strained the government’s reputation. The province’s Gwadar Port, framed as the jewel in the crown of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), was intended to anchor Chinese naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean. Instead, repeated attacks by the BLA throughout Balochistan, including on the port itself, have unnerved Chinese leadership. Beijing is stuck oscillating between the costly prospect of a complete withdrawal from Pakistan or continued involvement in what is becoming an increasingly deadly environment.
In November 2024, the virtual inauguration of a new airport in Gwadar underscored declining confidence in the government’s ability to get a hold on the situation. The BLA has made clear on countless occasions that its campaign against Pakistan will not cease until it achieves independence and the state ceases its perceived exploitation of the province’s resources and assets. Beijing’s prolonged presence in the country now appears increasingly contingent upon Islamabad allowing it to deploy its own security staff to protect Chinese citizens working on the numerous infrastructure projects in Pakistan.
At the same time, the US will also be watching events closely in Pakistan, especially following an apparent uptick in bilateral relations after Trump’s return to the White House. In his address to Congress in early March 2025, the US president specifically thanked Pakistan for the arrest and extradition of Mohammad Sharifullah, an Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) terrorist accused of planning the Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 US military personnel and 170 Afghans in August 2021.
At the same time, the US will also be watching events closely in Pakistan, especially following an apparent uptick in bilateral relations after Trump’s return to the White House.
The arrest evokes memories of the transactional US-Pakistan relationship of old, with the Trump administration authorizing the release of nearly $400 million intended to support the maintenance of Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 jets. The F-16 has, for decades, been a useful indicator of the status of relations between the two countries, with the supply of jets, parts, and financial support for maintenance free flowing during times of great cooperation and held back during periods of tension.
For its part, Islamabad now hopes to coax Washington into rebooting intelligence and security cooperation after a hiatus dating back to the first Trump administration. The BLA’s train hijacking is further proof of Pakistan’s desperate need for a strategic partner in its fight against rising militancy. In fact, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment hopes to convince the US to support its efforts against elements inside neighboring Afghanistan, the very same groups that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) once enjoyed close relations with.
Ironically, US patronage could safeguard Pakistan’s ties with China and prevent the derailing of CPEC. With an as yet undefined foreign policy direction in South Asia, it remains unclear whether the US will come to Pakistan’s aid once more, although the past four decades should offer considerable pause for thought.
Closer to home, as domestic affairs spiral out of control, the wider regional picture appears equally bleak for Pakistan. Just days after security forces resolved the train hijacking, the Pakistani Foreign Office summoned a senior Afghan diplomat to read him the riot act after allegations that the BLA had used Afghan territory to launch the attack.
In the days following the hijacking, the Pakistani government alleged that BLA militants had been in constant communication with “handlers in Afghanistan” throughout the attack. This is particularly worrisome for Islamabad, considering the TTP have long been exploiting the porous Afghan-Pakistani boundary to carry out cross border operations. With little assistance from Kabul in resolving this issue, the chances of the Taliban accommodating its neighbor’s requests now, regarding the BLA, are slim.
It is not clear where the Pakistani government goes from here, as attacks continue to persist in Balochistan. While the country has endured prolonged bouts of militancy in recent history, the odds have never been more stacked against its now-exhausted military establishment. Heavy handed reprisals, including suspending on-campus activities at the University of Balochistan, will only worsen resentment among the local population towards the government. With outside assistance not guaranteed and with the BLA, TTP, and other militant groups showing no signs of relenting, a complete collapse of the Pakistani state is no longer an improbable outcome.
You made it to the bottom of the page! That means you must like what we do. In that case, can we ask for your help? Inkstick is changing the face of foreign policy, but we can’t do it without you. If our content is something that you’ve come to rely on, please make a tax-deductible donation today. Even $5 or $10 a month makes a huge difference. Together, we can tell the stories that need to be told.
