The South Pacific Is the New Frontline in the Rivalry with China

A few weeks ago, commercial flights over the Tasman Sea — located between Australia and New Zealand — were forced to divert after they were warned by the Chinese navy that its warships were about to conduct live-fire exercises in the area. This is the latest example of China looking to expand its position in the South Pacific. For at least the last six years, China has made a more focused effort to get many of the Pacific island states, especially ones that recently switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing (for example, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati), to take part in a new wide-ranging set of development and security deals. Critically, in May 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attempted to have Pacific states sign a regional development and security deal outside of the Pacific Islands Forum — an intergovernmental organization that aims to enhance cooperation and integration among countries in that region. This was a “red flag” for 10 out of 18 members of the forum, who declined to sign China’s deal. Beijing’s failure demonstrated that even the smallest of countries can “say no” to China. But this was not the end of the match.

For much of the last quarter of a century, the Sino-U.S. rivalry was largely confined to East Asia. Recently, however, there is an increasing amount of competition between Washington and Beijing in the South Pacific. However, I find that America and China are playing different games. China’s game is centered more on elite capture, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and various infrastructure projects. The United States has been focused on the development of human capital and working with these small island nations through Australia and New Zealand.

While American leaders look to “outcompete” China, they should be careful not to engage in a form of competition that directly seeks to play Beijing’s game, due to the frequent wasteful nature of China’s approach to building influence. Based on a deep analysis of open-source material in English and Chinese, as well as substantial on-the-ground research in five countries, I first assess what America and China are competing over and then evaluate Chinese activities and American responses. Next, I discuss the responses of the Pacific island states as well as focus on how well they are “playing the game.” Finally, I recommend that Washington continues to coordinate efforts with partners and allies to prevent Chinese gains in the region, such as the establishment of Chinese military bases in the South Pacific, as well expanding programs with regional states such as the Shiprider Agreements.

What Are We Competing Over and How Are We Competing?

According to the Lowy Institute, from 2008 to 2022, China committed $10.6 billion in “total development finance” to the Pacific island states. Of this amount, only $4.5 billion has so far been spent. In contrast, over the same period, the United States committed $4.4 billion and spent $3.4 billion. It is important to note that while these figures may appear to be large, they are dwarfed by Australia, which committed $20.6 billion and spent $18.8 billion in the region. Beijing’s aspirations are large and, when coupled with its official assertion that the South Pacific is the part of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, they appear to be part of a perceived Chinese “Long Game.”

In 2022, Washington announced intentions to open embassies in Tonga and Kiribati. This was in addition to previous announcement of new American embassies in other states, including the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, for a total of three new embassies in the region since 2023 (the planned embassy in Kiribati has yet to be opened). This is the clearest example of Washington’s response to China in the Pacific. This is coupled with an increase in American outreach to the Pacific and the holding of two Pacific Forums in Washington with former President Joe Biden. The U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit, held in Washington in September 2022, is the most visible major diplomatic push by the Americans to respond to China. During the summit, Washington announced more than $810 million in expanded programs designed to improve human development in the Pacific. While the money was welcome news in the Pacific, Chinese commentators have also been quick to point out that the money has not yet been released — currently, large amounts of American assistance are on hold and under review.

Developing countries around the world are full of Chinese stadiums and other high-profile construction projects. These are the nuts and bolts of physical infrastructure development. However, many Chinese projects are also vanity projects such as the sports stadium in Honiara in the Solomon Islands and are designed to bolster local leaders political support, especially before an election cycle.

Arguments that the United States cannot compete with China are based on the belief that China can mobilize massive amounts of resources, which the United States lacks. On the surface this appears true, but the state capacity of the United States is enormous. When Washington needs to mobilize its resources, it can do so in a way that China cannot. However, there is a clear difference between Beijing and Washington when it comes to development assistance and economic statecraft: Chinese leaders have few domestic constraints.

It can be argued that China is not even competing with the United States in the region, while Washington is engaged in a game of catch-up that it will not win. This American approach can appear to be “great-power competition on the cheap.” U.S. embassies in the region (especially recently opened ones) are thinly staffed. For example, the U.S. embassy in Tonga’s newly opened visa service is “staffed by the Consular Team from U.S. Embassy Suva on a quarterly visit basis.” The fact that visa officials are not permanently based in the country reflects low levels of staffing. This is in comparison to a massive Chinese embassy complex with an estimated 20 staff that is located close by. This situation is repeated in other Pacific states where it is not uncommon to find U.S. embassies with only two or three American employees and no visa services for locals. This lack of visa services is a constant source of irritation for local populations. Many Pacific islanders have to fly to either Fiji or New Zealand for a visa interview, and are not always successful in obtaining a U.S. visa.

Influence

Ultimately Washington is competing over influence. While some of Beijing’s actions may not be direct responses to America, China is competing. There is a perception that China is attempting to thwart American goals in the region, as well as the widespread belief that China is practicing a form of “elite capture” in its South Pacific diplomacy, thus greatly increasing its influence. How one measures influence and how to obtain it is a tricky task. Washington stresses the need to build local human capital and to reinforce and strengthen what are relatively weak institutions in the region. This form of influence building is not very visible and takes years if not decades to reach noticeable levels of success. Contrary to Chinese claims, it is also the key ingredient of successful and sustained economic development.

Pacific States and Agency

Frequently lost in discussions over the Sino-American rivalry are the actual states where this competition is unfolding. Small states have enormous leverage and agency that they can use to extract concessions from the great powers, but South Pacific states have yet to clearly articulate a realistic strategy to deal with China. A coherent strategy does not have to be uniform across states, but it would allow regional states to exercise greater agency and extract more concessions from Beijing. Although a few states have published some guidance on foreign policy, such documents are thin on details on how they can benefit from great power competition. For example, Fiji has a Foreign Policy White Paper that recognizes the competition between China and the United States, while the Cook Islands have published an Action Plan that describes various areas of cooperation with China. Reports have stated that Papua New Guinea is expected to put out a foreign policy white paper next month, which if correct, it would be the first one since 1981. Furthermore, Vanuatu’s National Foreign Policy paper does acknowledge that great power competition has “provided opportunities for leveraging our new-found strategic relevance into tangible development gains for our people.” While such publications are helpful, they do not shed light on any concrete strategies. In addition to the above, a common perception is that Washington partially left the region after the Cold War, and then “the gap was filled by others.” What is clear is that most regional states do not want to take sides in the rivalry and are trying to figure out how to take advantage of the friction between the two powers.

How states can play the powers off each other is another issue. Accepting large amounts of Chinese loans may help build infrastructure, but it also risks a state being indebted to China. Currently seven Oceania states are at high risk of debt distress: Tuvalu, Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Micronesia, Kiribati and Vanuatu. Pacific states have demonstrated the ability to say no to China. The above case of Wang not being able to get countries to sign on to his proposal in May 2022 is a clear example of their agency. Furthermore, Chinese attempts in countries like Fiji to send in a police force have been met with firm resistance.

One often hears grumbling by both locals and the foreign diplomatic communities about the high number of Chinese workers who dominate in areas like retail and construction. This is also an example of agency, or lack thereof, on the part of national governments. These states issue visas to Chinese nationals and can restrict access. However, the hurdle of obtaining a visa was recently removed between China and the Solomon Islands, which both waived visa requirements for each other in 2024. In addition, Chinese traders pay locals to lease their land and then set up shop. For example, Chinese nationals have purchased land in Palau in the form of 50- to 99-year leases. A final challenge for regional states is the lack of a cohesive China strategy. For example, even though the Chinese government has set up Confucious Classrooms at three branches of the University of the South Pacific, many governments in the region lack a fulltime fluent Mandarin speaker, even though there is a noticeable Chinese business presence in most countries. Even if a China strategy emerged, elite capture by Beijing is a threat to a well-coordinated policy on China.

Bases and Strategic Significance to China

The strategic value of the Pacific island states is debatable. Certainly, in areas like fishing it is enormous, as well as in the potential for logistics hubs. Concerns around China building a military base in Kiribati, however, may be overblown. Fears that such a base could be used to target Hawaii with Chinese missiles or obstruct an American response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are misplaced. If a conflict erupts with China, any Chinese outpost in the vicinity of Hawaii would be wiped out in the opening hours. Second, the South Pacific is not a critical strategic interest for China. Evidence of this can be found in the decreasing amount of money China is spending in the region. For example, in both 2015 and 2016, Beijing spent $405 million and $412 million respectively in the region. However, from 2019 to 2022, it averaged only $240 million per year. If Beijing views the region as increasing in strategic importance, we should have seen a sustained expansion of Chinese investment. In addition, the South Pacific is not the northern Indian Ocean, through which 95 percent of Chinese trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe transits.

Concerns of a Chinese base may become a reality in the Solomon Islands, but this has yet to be proven. There would be enormous diplomatic pushback from Washington and Canberra, not to mention from the Pacific island states, to a Chinese military base in their immediate neighborhood. Charlot Salwai, the former prime minister of Vanuatu, promised that there will be no Chinese military presence in his country and even denied that talks about one had taken place. Reports that Beijing was seeking to refurbish a port on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea were quashed when Port Moresby turned to Australia and the United States to redevelop the site, due to greater trust in their traditional partners.

What to Do?

For the past several years Beijing has been streamlining and improving the Belt and Road Initiative. This “Belt and Road 2.0” is dramatically less wasteful than the original. As China continues to build its influence in the region, Washington needs to determine how critical the South Pacific is to both American and also to Chinese national interests. For China the region is peripheral and does not come remotely close to the strategic significance of East or Southeast Asia. Chinese projects in the South Pacific may be large on a per-capita basis, but they are of limited strategic value to China. The Pacific island states have a combined population of 2.3 million people, or roughly half a million fewer people than the population of Yantai, a city in Shandong province (although Papua New Guinea has a population of 10.3 million people). For its part, Washington can continue its outreach in the region with close coordination with Australia and New Zealand. American critical interest in the Pacific is heavily centered on the same areas that China is concerned with, Northeast and Southeast Asia. Washington should consider the following policy recommendations if it seeks to not only maintain but also expand its influence in the region.

First, Washington can continue to work with its partners and allies in the region in deepening engagement and outreach to the South Pacific. This also calls for close consultation and coordination with Australia and New Zealand, who have much more invested in the region. The recent friction between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, over the latter’s signing of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with Beijing, underscores the importance of the South Pacific to Wellington. This is an example where Washington does not have to invest significant resources but can rely on its allies to further American goals. Second, Washington can work with allies and partners in the region to persuade Pacific island states to not allow a potential Chinese military base on their soil. Finally, America can expand and reinforce the Shiprider Agreements with various regional states, which bring American and local maritime authorities together to work on maritime security. These agreements have immediate benefits for both the United States and the recipient country and this is an area in which China would have difficulty competing.

Overall, Washington needs to be cognizant that Pacific states have no interest in being pawns in the emerging great-power competition between the United States and China. They are very clear that they do not want to be forced to choose sides in the Sino-U.S. rivalry. Washington needs to realize that many regional states see Beijing as an opportunity and as a source of development. Ultimately, American attention to Pacific states will help blunt Beijing’s ambitions in the region.

Christopher K. Colley, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

Image: U.S. Coast Guard via Wikimedia Commons